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1. PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND LIMITATIONS OF REPORT
The purpose of this report is to provide a comprehensive, quantitative
basis for appraising the position of, the holdings of, and transactions in
corporate stock by institutional investors.1 Such an appraisal was needed
by the Securities and Exchange Commission as a background for its
Institutional Investors' Study. That study concentrates on the activities
of financial institutions in the stock market during the latter part of the
1960's and deals with the subject in much greater detail than was required
of the background study. It is based on extensive new primary statistical
data which were not available for this report.
The holdings of corporate stock by financial institutions are viewed in
this report in terms of their roles: (a) as part of the assets of financial
institutions and (b) as an element in the equity of corporations. These
aspects can be examined most satisfactorily within the framework of a
sectorized national balance sheet. Transactions are regarded as a com-
ponent of the flows—new issues of and trading in—corporate shares; in
that guise, they are best seen within the structure of a flow of funds
account.2 The choice of the analytic framework for holdings and trans-
actions is explained briefly in section 4.
The first task of the study, therefore, is to establish within this frame-
work, in as much detail and as accurately as this can be done on the
basis of the available statistical data and for as long a period as is possible
and relevant, the facts concerning holdings of and the trading in corporate
stock by the main types of financial institutions. More specifically, it is
1Fora list of the types of institutions included, see section 5a.
2Abrief description will be found in section 4.2 InstitutionalInvestors
necessary to determine two sets of ratios: (1) the share of corporate stock
in the total assets of, and in the acquisition of financial. assets by the differ-
ent types of financial institutions; and (2) the relation of the stockholdings
and stock transactions of financial institutions to the total value of cor-
porate stock outstanding or traded.
It would be desirable to determine these ratios separately for the main
types of corporate stock, for instance, for common and preferred stock,
and for the stock of the main groups of financial and nonfinancial cor-
porations. Generally, however, we must be content with ratios for all
corporate stock together. It is desirable to make these calculations on at
least an annual basis, but this is possible only for the period beginning
with the 1950's.
On the basis of these figures and ratios we must try. to determine whether
definite trends have existed in the institutional holdings of, and in the
transactions in, corporate stock in relation to the assets of financial
institutions and to the volume of corporate stock outstanding or traded;
and we must study how these movements have changed since corpora-
tions and financial institutions became important features in the American
economic and financial scene during the third quarter of the nineteenth
century. Finally, we must try to explain such significant movements as
may be found, at least to the extent of ascertaining the immediate econ-
omic and institutional determinants. It will not be possible in this report
to go beyond this first stage of causal analysis since this would require an
analysis of the entire process of American economic and financial develop-
ment during the last century.
This report, therefore, is primarily fact-finding and descriptive in nature
and proceeds on a fairly high level of aggregation. It does not deal with
the desirability, from the point of view of whatever standards the analyst
may want to apply, of the developments observed. Nor does it consider,
except in section 2, policies that might have led to different trends from
those actually observed or that might affect their continuation or modifica-
tion. Because of lack of data, time, and resources, no attention is paid to
the experience of individual financial institutions or of subgroups within
the fairly broad categories distinguished by available statistics, or to
developments during periods shorter than a single year.
Technically the core of this report is a set of sectoral annual balance
sheets and sources-and-uses-of-funds statements for the years 1953
through 1968, and the equivalent but much rougher statistics for spans of
seven to twenty years during earlier periods that are presented in Chap-
ter 2. These statistics generally distinguish four nonfinancial sectorsBasic Considerations S
(households, including or separating agricultureand other unincorporated
business enterprises; nonfinancial corporations; state and local govern-
ments; and the federal government). The financial sector is divided into
about a dozen institutional subsectors. The main contributions of the
report from the statistical point of view for the postwar period are:
1. Estimates of national wealth—structures, equipment, inventories,
and land—by sectors for the period 1959—68 and the revision of previous
estimates for the years 1952—58.
2. The separation of personal trust funds administered by commercial
banks (to be included with financial institutions) and of two groups of
nonprofit institutions (foundations and universities and colleges) from the
household sector, which thus becomes considerably more homogeneous.
3. .A rough breakdown of the now more narrowly defined household
sector into half-a-dozen subsectors classified by wealth (Appendix V).
4. The inclusion of several relatively small groups of financial institu-
tions which formerly were omitted from the flow of funds statistics:
fraternal insurance organizations, mortgage companies (formerly included
with finance companies), closed-end investment companies, and common
trust funds.
The main statistical limitations of this material are briefly discussed in
section 5.
2.THEROLE OF CORPORATE STOCK ANDOFFINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY
There can be no doubt about the importance of either corporate stock
or financial institutions for the size and character of the financial super-
structure of the American economy. After all, in 1968 corporate stock
having a total value of fully $1,000 billion (excluding intercorporate
holdings) represented about one-fourth of the value of all financial assets
outstanding in the United States, while the assets of financial institutions,
including personal trust departments, came to approximately $1,600
billion, equal to another two-fifths of the total. Eliminating the duplica-
tion involved in the corporate holdings of stock by financial institutions of
about $250 billion, financial institutions and corporate stock together
represented more than one-half of the financial superstructure of the
United States. The question, however, is to what extent and how the
operations of financial institutions on the one hand and the issuance of
and transactions in corporate stock on the other have contributed to
the growth of the American economy in the past 100 to 120 years, a
period during which both of them acquired substantial importance. The4 Institutional Investors
same question, of course, can be asked for the postwar period. In what
direction have these phenomena influenced the present organization and
efficiency of the American economy, as well as the distribution of its
ownership and control?
Answers to these questions are not as evident as it may appear. For
it is not sufficient to argue that the modern American economy, as the
economy of any other developed noncommunist country, could. not
operate without the process of indirect saving and investment through
financial institutions or without the widespread ownership of large
business enterprises that is made possible through marketable corporate
stock. Following the method of counterfactual hypotheses dear to some
contemporary economic historians, one may visualize a modern economy
organized predominantly in privately owned large enterprises, without
financial institutions other than a monetary system and without use of
corporate stock, or at least wihout a stock market, in which case participa-
tion intheownership of corporations would be nonmarketable and
similar to equity in partnerships. In such an economy, enterprises would
be financed by a combination of retained earnings and the issuance of
different types of claims sold directly to savers. It is even easier to visualize
a modern economy without nonmonetary financial institutions (and thus
still having a banking system issuing paper currency and check deposits,
though not accepting time and saving deposits), in which both corporate
stock and all types of claims against nonfinancial borrowers are held
directly by savers and are traded among them on organized exchanges or
elsewhere. If the American economy had thus been limited to internal and
external direct financing, through the sale of securities to the non-
financial sector (excluding external indirect financing by financial
institutions except in the form of money), could it have grown as it
actually has and could it have reached the present level of production and
consumption?
The main difference between this hypothetical economy, 'lacking
nonmonetary financial institutions and marketable corporate stock, and
the actual one that exists today in the United States lies in the structure
of the portfolio of households. At the present time, fully one-tenth of
household portfolios consist of direct claims aganst nonfinancial sectors;
fully two-fifths consist of equities in corporate and unincorporated business
enterprises, and another two-fifths are claims against and stock of financial
nonmonetary intermediaries (the remaining one-tenth represents money
held by individuals). In the hypothetical economy, household portfolios
would be divided exclusively—apart from money—---among the first twoBasic Considerations 5
typesof financial instruments. (It may be well to recall how much closer
the actual situation was to this hypothesis as late as 1900. At that time
individuals' portfolios consisted of approximately one-fourth of non-
monetary claims against and stock in financial institutions, while claims
against and stock in nonfinancial sectors accounted for over two-thirds
of total household financial assets, money making up the remaining
5 percent) .3
Whatare the preconditions regarding investors' habits, the operations
of the investment banking machinery, and the level and structure of
yields of financial instruments that would make it possible to operate the
present American economy without nonmonetary financial institutions
and without marketable corporate stock? Or, phrased differently, in
what respects would an American economy, having basically the present
structure of production, differ in the absence of nonmonetary financial
institutions and of marketable corporate stock, assuming the existence of
a monetary system in the form of a central bank that issued both currency
and check money and had as assets monetary metals, foreign exchange,
and claims against nonfinancial sectors, the Treasury, and business and
state and local governments?
1. Almost certainly the value of household saving and investment would
be lower than it actually is and was, although we cannot say by how much.
This can be deduced from the fact that households have actually preferred
indirect nonmonetary to direct saving for a large part of their total
accumulated financial assets, and that the elasticity of substitution between
direct and indirect nonmonetary financial saving of households is very
unlikely to be perfect. Hence, we could' not expect a reduction in indirect
nonmonetary household saving to have been fully compensated for by an
identical increase in their direct financial saving. As a result, reproducible
tangible wealth would almost certainly be lower than it actually is today.
The question is, which forms of capital formation or real assets would be
more important and which less important than they actually are?
2. The absence of nonmonetary financial institutions would mean the
absence of deposit claims against banks and thrift institutions and of
contractual claims against insurance companies and pension and social
security funds(i.e., policyholders' and beneficiaries' equity), and of
See R. W. Goldsmith, R. E. Lipsey, and M. Mendelson, Studies in the National Balance
Sheet of the United States, Vol. 2, Princeton, Princeton University Press for National Bureau
of Economic Research, 1963, pp. 72—73. Personal trust funds are treated as nonmonetary
claims against financial institutions while equity in unincorporated business is regarded
as part of direct financial assets.6 Institutional Investors
shares in investment companies and other financial institutIons. The
consequences are not quite as radical as it might appear. Insurance and
pension organizations could operate on a pay-as-you-go principle—life
insurance companies selling only short-term insurance—thus avoiding
the accumulation of assets except for a small working fund in the form of
money. There is little doubt, however, that the taxes or equivalent levies
necessary to operate this regime of provision for retirement income would
have reduced individual consumption less than the voluntary, contractual,,
and compulsory saving under the present system. Instead of holding
claims against thrift institutions, households would have, acquired short-,
medium-, and long-term obligations directly from the nonfinancial sectors
that certainly would have been issued in much larger amounts, and
probably also in smaller denominations, than under the present system,
if only because governments and business enterprises would have had to
find substitutes for the funds now supplied by financial institutions. It is
unlikely, though not impossible, that the additional sales would be as
large as the foregone saving in the form of thrift deposits and insurance
contracts.
3. If liquidity preference (including preference for not only money but
also other nearly riskiess claims encashable in practice on demand) had
been the same as it has been, it is very likely that households or business
enterprises would hold more money than they do now. This means that
part of the external financing of the nonfinancial sectors now provided
by nonmonetary financial institutions would have been furnished by the
monetary system. This would not necessarily have led to a sharper rise
in prices as the income velocity of circulation would have been lower.
4. Concentration among business enterprises probably would be con-
siderably more pronounced, one of the important probable consequences
of the absence of nonmonetary financial institutions and of marketable
corporate stock. The reason is that under such a regime the need to raise
a much larger proportion of external financing by sale of obligations
directly to households (and to a limited extent to other business enter-
prises with surplus funds) would have given an advantage to enterprises
widely known to the general public and able to sell large homogeneous
debt issues in small denominations.
5. For the same reasons long-, medium-, and short-term obligations
of business enterprises and governments would be much more extensively
distributed than they are now, or have been in the past. Similarly the
secondary market, on exchanges or over the counter, for these obligations
would be much broader and more active. In other words, there wouldBasic Considerations 7
have occurred a large-scale replacement of "debtor substitution," which
is the essence of financial intermediation by "brokerage." Brokers'
offices—dealing in obligations rather than in stocks—would functionally
and physically have taken the place of the edifices' of commercial banks,
savings and loan associations, and credit unions, and the treasurers of
large nonfinancial enterprises and government units would deal' with
investment banks and brokers instead of with commercial banks and thrift
and insurance organizations.
6. In the absence of banks and finance companies, all consumer credit
would be extended by the business enterprises producing or selling the
commodity or service. These enterprises would have to raise the necessary
funds by either income retention or by sale of their own obligations to
the general public. This would most likely lead to a much more pronoun-
ced concentration in retail trade.
7. Trade credit (accounts receivable and payable) would almost
certainly be more important because of the absence of commercial banks
as suppliers of short-term funds. This would have given another advantage
to large units able to sell their own obligations on a nationwide or at least
a regional market. It also is possible that the difficulty of securing short-
term funds would have led to earlier or more intensive economizing on
inventories, with the consequence of a more restricted assortment (less
choice for consumers) and longer delays in filling orders.
8. Security credit would be insignificant, if it is assumed that brokers
and dealers in securities would be prevented from becoming financial
institutions by accepting deposits from customers, even in the form of
temporary credit balances.
9. Among the main sectors of real capital formation, the one probably
most seriously' affected by the absence of financial institutions would be
homes. It obviously would be much more difficult for
the prospective owners of such structures to find mortgage lenders among
other individuals, or possibly among builders using their accumulated
savings, than it is now where these loans are made routinely in large
numbers by financial institutions. Assuming the same total demand for
shelter, multifamily structures owned by large real estate corporations
able to sell their bonds to the general public would probably have taken
the place of a substantial fraction of present one-family owner-occupied
homes and of small apartment houses owned by individuals. Thus the
absence of financial institutions would have resulted in a quite different
distribution of housing between owner-occupied and rented quarters.
10. For similar reasons, farmers would probably have found it more8 InstitutionalInvestors
difficult to secure long-term and even short-term funds. Hence, it is
likely that large agricultural enterprises, well enough known to sell their
obligations to the general public through the investment banking and
brokerage machinery, though probably on a local and regional rather than
on a national basis, would have grown more rapidly than they have. On.
the other hand, concentration among owner-operated farms probably
would have made less progress, the farmers being hampered by fewer
sources of funds to acquire additional acreage, with the consequence of
less inequality among farmers.
11. The absence of marketable corporate stock and financial institutions,
of course, would have very great influence on the financial structure of
nonfinancial business enterprises. In particular, the need to rely exclusively
on debt financing might have led to substantially less venturesome
attitudes by entrepreneurs. That rapid economic growth is possible with
a much higher debt-to-equity ratio than prevails in the United States is,
however, indicated by the cases of Japan and Italy in the postwar period;
and it is possible that nonfinancial enterprises would have adapted them-
selves fully to the need of relying much more on debt financing. The
absence of substantial net worth would have made investment in the debt
securities of nonfinancial enterprises more risky and thus would have
acted as another incentive to greater concentration, since it may be
assumed that giant enterprises would have been better able to reduce the
danger of inability to meet their obligations by spreading of risk and,
ultimately, by reliance on the central government.
12. Regional differences in interest rates, saving, and investment
probably would be larger than observed, if the American economy had
operated without nonmonetary financial institutions and without a
market for corporate stock. While it is possible that a substantial degree of
equalization in the availability and terms of direct external finance would
have been brought about by the operation of a more highly developed net
of investment banking facilities and a much broader secondary market
in the obligations of governments and business enterprises, it is very
unlikely that this could have been done as efficiently as is possible through
the activities of financial institutions operating on a nationwide scale
directly or indirectly, e.g., through a system of correspondents.
13. The probable effects of the absence of financial institutions and of a
stock market on the level of interest rates, on the differentials among
rates, and on the fluctuations in rates are very difficult to assess. It seems
likely, however, that under such conditions the level of interest rates on
obligations of nonfinancial issuers would have been somewhat higher thanBasic Considerations 9
it actually has been, because savers,who, as history shows, have preferred
to hold claims against nonmonetary financial institutions, would have to
be offered higher rates to hold claims against nonfinancial issuers. It is not
certain that this differential would have been substantially larger than the
interest margin inherent in the operation of nonmonetary financial insti-
tutions. Of the main rates, that for home mortgages probably would have
been raised most. The yield on Treasury securities probably would have
been lowered relative to other rates because they would have become,
even more than in. actuality, the haven of risk-averting savers. In the
absence of the generally smoothing influence of financial institutions,
variations in rates, both over full business cycles and for shorter periods,
as well as seasonally, most likely would have been more pronounced; so
would interregional differences in interest rates.
14. One important argument remains to be met. Would not the absence
of commercial banks as we know them have slowed down the growth of
the American economy gravely, given the crucial importance assigned to
expansionary bank credit in many theories of economic development
(starting with that ofJoseph Schumpeter)animportance backed by the
concrete examples of Germany before World War I and of Japan after
World War II? It is hard to deny the likelihood of some influence in this
direction, but it should be realized that, in the counterfactual hypothetical
situation envisaged here, the expansion of check money by the central
bank would have taken the place of the expansion of the credit of com-
mercial banks, reflecting the creation of check deposits which has been
observed in the actual development of the American economy.
The question then comes down to whether the assets likely to have been
acquired by the central bank in issuing check money would have differed
sufficiently from those actually acquired by commercial banks to retard
economic growth substantially. The answer depends on the assumption
made about the methods of operation of the central bank. If it had limited
itself to international assets and to Treasury securities, the growth-
reducing influence of its operations, which replaced those of commercial
banks, probably would have been substantial. If, on the other hand, the
central bank had acquired short- and long-term obligations of business
enterprises as part cover for its currency and check money issues, as is
entirely compatible with the essence of the counterfactual hypothesis, the
retarding effect might have been very small. One important difference
Theorie der Wirtschaftlichen Eniwicklung, Duncker and Humblot, 1912; translated by
R. Opie as The TheoryofEconomic Development, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University
Press, 1934.10 InstitutionalInvestors
between the two regimes, however, would have remained: In the absence
of the numerous individual commercial banks, mostly of local character,
that have constituted the American banking system, concentration of the
creation of money in the hands of one central bank would have provided
the possibility of a much more conscious allocation of expansionary credit
among industries, regions, borrowers of different size, businesses of
different degree of risk, and other characteristics. This allocation might
well have differed considerably from that which actually took place in a
system combining competition and oligopoly and essentially guided by
considerations of risk and profitability. Thus, a considerable difference in
the allocation of expansionary bank credit between the two regimes is a
possibility, but is not a necessity, particularly if the operations of the cen-
tral bank ..had been decentralized to regional and possibly local levels.
We may conclude from this imaginary picture of a mid-twentieth
century America without financial institutions and without marketable
corporate stock (and hence without a stock market) that the rate of
household and total national saving and investment would have been
somewhat lower, the rate of growth of output somewhat smaller, and the
stock of reproducible tangible assets somewhat smaller than they actually
turned out to be. Whether the difference would have been large enough
substantially to affect the standard of living of the American people is
uncertain. However, it would have considerably affected the distribution
of wealth—though not necessarily the distribution of earned income—by
sharply reducing realized and unrealized capital gains on corporate stocks,
which are the main source of modern large fortunes. This might have had
great influence on the social structure of the United States in the direction
of lessening inequality. Thus the absence of marketable corporate stock
probably would have been more important in making the economy
different from what it now is than the absence of nonmonetary financial
institutions.
These speculations at the same time indicate the effect of the introduc-
tion and spread of a market in corporate stock and of nonmonetary
financial institutions on the country's economic growth. In brief these
two developments are likely to have slightly increased the volume of
national saving and investment and hence the rate of growth of the
economy and its stock of tangible assets; to have reduced the level,
variability, and regional differences of interest rates; to have retarded
the trend towards concentration among business enterprises; but to have
accelerated the accumulation of large fortunes. Among the main non-
financial sectors of the economy the operation of nonmonetary financialBasic Considerations 11
institutionshas probably been most helpful to the market for home and
farm mortgages, and thus to the spread of home ownership, in the face of
rapid urbanization of the country, to the maintenance of the family farm
system, and even more to the concentration of farm operations in a
declining number of family farms.
We may now turn to a much weaker counterfactual hypothesis, but one
that may be more directly relevant to this study. This is the assumption
that, in the face of the existence of nonmonetary financial institutions and
of a stock market, financial institutions would have been prevented, by
statute, tradition, or otherwise, from owning or administering corporate
stock portfolios.
This assumption is counterfactual essentially only for the period since
World War I, and in a significant sense only for the last two decades. For
the half-century before World War I, the actual situation was so close to
this weaker counterfactual hypothesis that its investigation is without
much interest. The main exception to the hypothesis—the administration
of substantial blocks of stock by personal trust departments of banks and
trust companies—certainly is not a sufficient basis for a claim that anything
of importance in the American economy would have been different if these
blocks had been administered directly by the beneficiaries or by non-
financial trustees.
For the period since World War I, or at least for the last twenty years,
however, the absence of financial institutions as buyers of corporate stock
might have had substantial influence on the character of the market for
corporate stock, for stock prices, for individual portfolios, and possibly
even for some more basic factors, like, the levels of interest rates, saving,
and investment. Until well into the 1950's, actual purchases of corporate
stock by financial institutions were so small that the effects could only
have been minor. It is only during the last dozen years, and particularly
since 1965, that the absorption of corporate stock by financial institutions
has been large enough for its absence to have possibly led to substantial
differences in the market for corporate stock, and with less likelihood in the
basic economic situation of the country.
It is doubtful that the funds available to thrift and insurance organiza-
tions would have been smaller if çhey had not bought any corporate stock.
The only difference would have been the acquisition of about $50 billion
of government, corporate, or foreign bonds and of mortgages in lieu of an
equal amount of corporate stock. Investment companies, of course, would
have been of much smaller size if they had been limited to fixed interest
bearing securities, reducing the demand for stock by less than $15 billion.12 InstitutionalInvestors
This however would not have been a net reduction in the demand for
stocks of all types, but only a substitution of the demand for stocks of
industrial, etc., corporations for that of investment companies.
As we do not know enough about the nature of the stocks bought by
financial institutions, it is difficult to say how the retention of these stocks
in individual portfolios—not necessarily those owning them at the begin-
fling of the period—would have affected any basic economic factor such
as interest rates, saving, investment, and corporate financing. In view of
the very low volume of net issues of corporate stock (discussed in Chapter
4) it is, however, unlikely that the absence of financial institutions as
buyers would have made much difference in the total volume of stock
issued by nonfinancial corporations, except in the cases of a few corpora-
tions favored much more by financial institutions than by individual
holders.
There are only two aspects of the market for corporate stock in which
we may be certain that the absence of financial institutions as buyers
would have had a substantial effect: the price of common stock and the
volume of stock trading. It is very likely that the observed rise in stock
prices would have been smaller, particularly during the 1960's, if financial
institutions had not bid away fully $60 billion of stock, or something like
one-eighth of their total portfolios, from the previous individual holders.
It is even more certain that the volume of trading on exchanges and in the
over-the-counter market would have been smaller, since individual share-
holders are unlikely to have indulged as much in in-and-out trading in the
late 1960's as the adherents of the performance cult among financial
institutions. Because of our limited information on the distribution of stock
purchases by institutional investors among individual issues and groups
of them it is again very difficult to say how their absence would have
affected relative stock prices. Obviously, the relative prices of the favorites
of financial institutions would have risen less in comparison with other
stocks, but unless we know much more about the character of these
favorites such a statement is not very meaningful. Since stock prices
reached their peak near the end of 1968 and have been declining sharply
in 1969 and the first half of 1970, it becomes even more doubtful what net
effect, if any, the substitutions of about $60 billion of purchases of common
stock by institutions (excluding their personal trust departments) has had
in the long run on the level of stock prices in general and on relative stock
prices, let alone on basic factors of the economy.
Thus, the tentative conclusion regarding the weaker counterfactual
hypothesis is that it would not have made very much of a difference forBasic Considerations 13
thebasic factors of the American economy—though it would have sub-
stantially affected employment and profits in the securities business—if
financial institutions had been prevented from acquiring corporate stock.
3.THEDETERMINANTS OF THE SHARE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
IN CORPORATE STOCK
a. The Factors Involved
An understanding of the level and the movements of the share of
financial institutions in the total amount of corporate stock issued during
a given period or outstanding at one point in time requires an analysis of
the factors which determine the level and movements of the numerator
and the denominator of the appropriate ratio, i.e., (a) the value of the net
purchases and the holdings of corporate stock by financial institutions; and
(b) the volume of total net issues and the market value of outstandings of
corporate stock.
Beginning with the numerator of these ratios, net acquisition of corpor-
ate stock by financial institutions during a given period may be decom-
posed into two parts.
1. The increase or decrease in total assets of financial institutions during
the period, excluding valuation changes which reflect changes in the
price of corporate stock and secondarily in the price of other assets. This
increase or decrease, in turn, is dependent on several important economic
factors which cannot be followed and explained here, such as the degree of
monetization of the economy, the share of indirect saving (i.e., saving
through financial institutions) in total saving, and the degree of layering
among financial institutions (i.e., the extent to which some financial
institutions hold claims against or shares of other financial institutions).
2. The proportion of the net acquisition of assets by financial institutions
which are allocated to corporate stock; or the statistically more easily
ascertainable proportion of the change in assets other than claims against
other financial institutions, which takes the form of corporate stock.
The volume of net new issues of corporate stock, the denominator of the
ratio, in turn, depends on two factors:
3. The volume of securities issued by domestic corporations, which may
be regarded as closely connected with the volume of capital expenditures
that is financed externally, i.e., through borrowing or the issuance of equity
securities.
4. The proportion of total net issues by corporations that takes the form
of stock. This, ratio is affected by numerous factors, such as differences14 Institutional Investors
among yield rates for debt and equity securities, the costs of issuing
different types of securities, asset price changes, 'variability of issuer's
income, the issuer's capital structure, tax considerations, and many other
factors studied by the theory of finance.
Chart 1-1 illustrates schematically the relations between these four
factors, indicates the ratios which link them, and shows a few important
related relationships. According to the approach taken here, the share of



















The Derivation of the Ratio of Net Purchases of Nonfinancial




































whichthis report is primarily interested—is thus seen to be the result of
seven ratios:
a. The new-issue ratio of financial institutions, i.e., the ratio of total
net new issues by financial institutions to gross national product
b. The layering ratio (A), which measures the extent to which net
issues by financial institutions Consist of issues to other financial institutions
and which in accounting terms can be defined as the ratio of the com-
bined to the consolidated issues of all financial institutions;
c. The share of corporate stock in total net acquisition of assets by
financial institutions other than claims against (and stock of) other
financial institutions (x);
d. The national capital formation ratio, i.e., the ratio of total gross
capital expenditures to gross national product (K);
e.The share of nonfinancial corporations in total gross capital
expenditures (y);
f.The external financing ratio of nonfinancial corporations (n), i.e.,
the ratio of total capital expenditures of nonfinancial corporations to the
net issuance of debt and equity securities by them;
g. The share of stock in total net new issues by nonfinancial corpora-
tions (e).
The seven ratios then combine in the expression,
—.A)oc
'(VIlE
thethree ratios of the numerator referring to financial institutions, the
four ratios of the denominator to nonfinancial corporations.5 The absolute
value of gross national product, of course, does not influence the value of
this ratio, a desirable feature since it makes the ratios for different periods
of time or for different countries directly comparable.
It will be seen that the e,cpression's numerator,
increase in combined assets of financial institutions
gross national product
increase in consolidated assets of financial institutions
increase in combined assets
institutional net purchases of corporate stock
total uses of funds offinancial institutions'
simplifies(approximately) to express net institutional acquisitions of stock in nonfinancial
corporations as a fraction of gross national product; and its denominator,
(continued)16 InstitutionalInvestors
These relations may be illustrated by an example which is not too
different from the figures observed for the United States during the post-
war period. With a net new-issue ratio of financial institutions of q',0.10;
a layering ratio A of 0.10, so that 1 —A=0.90;a share of corporate stock
in total net acquisition of assets by financial institutions of=0.05;a
national capital formation ratio (including consumer and government
durables) of K= 0.25;a share of corporations in total national capital
expenditures of y =0.30;an external financing ratio of nonfinancial
corporations of q =0.35;and a proportion of stock in external financing
of 0.05,the value of the ratio of financial institutions to total net new
issues of stocks by nonfinancial corporations emerges as equal to about
Thus the net acquisition of stock of nonfinancial corporations by
financial institutions would on these assumptions be about three and
one-half times as large as the total issuance of such stock (the excess, of
course, being offset by net sales by nonfinancial sectors), a figure which is
corroborated by flow of funds statistics.
Relationships equivalent to these flow magnitudes and ratios, of
course, exist between the values of the holdings of corporate stock by
financial institutions and the value of corporate stock outstanding at a
given point of time, since these magnitudes may be regarded as the
result of (1) the accumulation of net issues of corporate stock and of net
asset acquisitions by financial institutions in the past, and (2) realized and
(Note 5, continued)
total gross capital expenditures
Ky?JE=
grossnational product
capital expenditures by nonfinancial corporations
total gross capital expenditures
external financing by nonfinancial corporations
capital expenditures by nonfinancial corporations
net new issues of corporate stock by nonfinancial corporations
external financing by nonfinancial corporations
simplifies (exactly) to express total net new issues of stock by nonfinancial corporations
as a fraction of gross national product. The quotient, of course, provides the desired
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unrealizedvaluation changes on corporate stock and other price-sensitive
assets since the time of issuance or acquisition by financial institutions.
As these relationships are more complex algebraically than those existing
among the flows illustrated in Chart 1-1, which disregard valuation
changes during the relatively short periods to which they refer, their
derivation is not given here.7
b. Total Resources of Financial Institutions
Before assessing the share of corporate stockholdings in the assets of
financial institutions, it is necessary to the determinants of the
growth of total assets of these institutions. From the economic point of
view, the resources of financial institutions—in accounting, equal to
sources of funds, i.e., liabilities and net worth—may be regarded as repre-
senting essentially five components, each of which has its own determin-
ants and often follows its own path.
The first component is money, in the form of (a) bank notes issued in the
United States primarily by commercial banks (state banks before 1864,
national banks from 1864 to 1935) and by the Federal Reserve banks
(since 1914); and (b) demand deposits with commercial banks.°
The second component consists of (a) thrift deposits of households with
commercial and savings banks, saving and loan associations, and credit
unions, and (b) household claims against insurance organizations, in-
cluding life insurance companies and private and government pension
funds. These constitute an important part of an individual's financial and
total saving. For this reason this component also includes, where statistic-
ally feasible, individual holdings of investment company shares.
The third component is of a mixed nature, comprising time and savings
deposits and insurance claims of nonfinancial sectors other than house-
holds, i.e., mainly those of business, government, nonprofit institutions,
and foreigners.
The fourth component consists of the equity of financial institutions in
corporate form. The equity in mutual financial institutions, such as most
life insurance companies, saving and loan associations and mutual
savings banks, may be regarded as a form of claim of the depositors or
policyholders, which is held predominantly by households.
?Forsuch a derivation, see R. W. Goldsmith, Financial Structure and Development, New
Haven, Yale University Press, 1969, p. 80 if.
As is well known, some economists prefer a broader definition of money, which
includes the time and savings deposits with commercial banks and sometimes even
deposits with a few other financial institutions. If such a definition is accepted, the second
and third components are reduced correspondingly.18 InstitutionalInvestors
The fifth and last component is made up of claims and debts among
financial institutions and of equity securities of one financial institution
held by another, and thus constitutes a duplication eliminated in a
consolidated balance sheet of the financial sector..
The changes in these items are, of course, matched by equivalent
changes in assets on the other side of the balance sheet, if capital gains and
other valuation changes are excluded on both sides.
Since economic interest is not primarily directed to the absolute dollar
values involved but to their relation to economic magnitudes characteristic
of the size of an economy, it is preferable to express the figures as per-
centages of gross national product in the case of issues of financial instru-
ments and of national wealth in the case of financial assets and liabilities.
We may then express the net issues by financial institutions in a simple
equation. On the left-hand side of this equation we find the magnitude
we want to explain, namely, the ratio of all issues9 of financial institutions
to gross national product, a ratio which has been designated by 4. On the
right side we encounter five components four of which are expressed
as ratios to national product.
The first component is the ratio of net issues of money (m), i.e., the net
change in the money stock, to gross national product. This ratio depends
on numerous factors which have been analyzed. for decades by monetary
theory. Among them are the factors which determine the income and
transactions velocity of money, such as the degree of division of labor in the
economy; payment habits, particularly the extent to which payments are
synchronized; and the propensity to use money for purposes other than as
the medium of exchange, e.g., the propensity to hoard it or to hold it as a
temporary investment.
The second component depends on total personal saving and on the
share of claims against thrift institutions and insurance organizations (and
possibly of purchases of stock of open-end investment companies) in total
personal saving. Total personal saving, again, may be regarded as the
product of, first, the personal saving ratio (s), i.e., the ratio of total saving
to personal disposable income; and, second, the share of personal dis-
posable income in GNP (p).Thedefinition and the determinants of total
personal saving have been subject to long debates among economists and
statisticians, debates which are far from being settled. In the United
States the personal saving ratio, if defined to include saving through
0Theterm it may be recalled, refers not only to stocks and bonds, but also to
the net increase in all other forms of short- and long-term liabilities and equity (such as
increases in earned net worth). (Issues may, of course, be negative.)Basic Considerations 19
consumer durables, as well as the ratio of personal disposable income to gross
national product have shown substantial cyclical variations and have
suffered a few marked disturbances over short periods, for instance during
the two world, wars and during the Great Depression. During this century
and probably since the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the
ratios do not seem to have shown a continuous pronounced trend. For this
investigation the personal saving ratio is defined as the share of personal
saving that is in the form of household claims against thrift institutions
and insurance organizations. This ratio must be compared with its com-
petitors for individuals' saving, such as the purchases of government and
corporate securities and of mortgages and saving through tangible assets,
primarily homes and consumer durables, asis done in Chapter 5, and may
be treated as exogenous. The latter ratio may, in turn, be regarded as the
product of two other relations: the share of gross financial saving (i.e., the
accumulation, of financial assets excluding valuation changes) in total
personal saving (c), and the share of household claims against thrift
institutions and insurance organizations in total financial saving (t).
Thethird component (x) is a residual. Time and saving deposits of
nonfinancial sectors, other than households, and business claims against
property insurance companies are its largest single elements. It may be
regarded here as exogenous.
While a small part of the equity of financial institutions in corporate
form is held by nonfinancial business and by government, it may be
justified to make the simplifying assumption that all equity securities of
financial corporations are held by households except those in the hands of
other financial institutions. Hence we may use the share of.. equity (net
issues of corporate stock plus retained earnings) in total issues of financial
institutions as the determining factor and may designate it by e.
Claims and holdings of equity securities among financial institutions are
,best measured by the layering ratio (A), i.e., the share of the issues of





Forpurposes of illustration we may assume the following period averages
for the,. components of
m =2percent of GNP;20 InstitutionalInvestors
s =10percent of personal disposable income;
p= 80percent of GNP;
c =75percent of total personal saving;
I =60percent of total personal financial saving;
x =1percent of GNP;
e =5percent of total issues by financial institutions;
A =10percent.
This yields, ifis expressed as a percentage of gross national product,
[2 + (10 x .80 x .75 x .60) + l](1.00 —.10)
=6.20.
1.00.05(1.00—.10)
On these assumptions, therefore, the issues of financial institutions—
and hence, in the absence of valuation changes, the change in the assets
of financial institutions—equal 6.2 percent of GNP.
If this ratio had, on the average, prevailed over a very long period, and
if GNP had increased, again on the average for the same long period, by
g percent a year, then the ratio of the assets of financial institutions to
national product (F), which in the absence of valuation changes is equal
to their cumulated past net issues, to the final period's gross national
product (y), would be approximately F/y = If, for instance, gross
national product had been increasing at an average of 5 percent per year,
and ifhad had the value of 6.2 percent assumed in the illustration
above, then F would be equal to 6.20/.05 =124percent of current gross
national product. Further, assuming a ratio between net national wealth
and gross national product (sometimes called the capital-output ratio) of
4, F would be equal to 124/4 =31percent of national wealth)-°
The formula thus shows how the components distinguished here influ-
ence the relative size of financial institutions in an economy's capital flows
and wealth holdings. It shows, for instance, that (in the absence of valua-
tion changes) the assets of financial institutions (F) are positively related to
m, s, p,c,t, x, and e, but negatively related to g and k. A discussion of the
factors which, in turn, affect the level and movements of these com-
ponents is beyond the scope of this report, though an idea will be given, as
10Thederivation of these relations is somewhat more difficult, if the period for which
data are available is shorter, if the component ratios have during parts of the period
deviated considerably from their average for the entire period, and if part of the assets of
financial institutions (primarily their holdings of corporate stock) have undergone valua-
tion changes (see Goldsmith, Financial Structure and Development, Chapter 2). The essential
relationships are, however, not affected by such complications.Basic Considerations 21
faras the data are available, of how the observed values of each have
moved over the last century in the United States.
c. The Share of Corporate Stock in the Assets of Financial Institutions
There are at least half a dozen factors that must be considered in looking
behind the share of corporate stock in the assets of financial institutions
and the makeup of their stock portfolios. One of these, of course, is the set
of regulations, by statute or less formal means, which limit or even pro-
hibit the holding of stock for most types of financial institutions, and which,
in addition, make provisions regarding the character of the stocks that may
be held, thus affecting the size and composition of the institutions' port-
folios. Such regulations are most rigi4 for banks, but they also are fairly
strict for life insurance companies and public pension funds. They are
more lenient, i.e., allowing a larger proportion of stocks to be held and
imposing fewer conditions on the types of stock held, in the case of prop-
erty insurance companies. They are almost absent for investment
companies, private pension funds, common trust funds, and, apart from
the provisions in individual trust instruments, for personal trust funds. On
the other hand, the holding of certain stocks is required for a few types of
financial institutions, such as the holdings of stock in the Federal Reserve
banks by member commercial banks and the holdings of stock in the
Federal Home Loan Banks by member saving and loan associations.
Traditions, partly stemming from possible adverse publicity, are an
additional factor that often have kept actual stock holdings below legally
permitted levels. The effect of such traditions has been particularly evident
in the case of state and local pension funds and in the case of life insurance
companies, from the time of the Armstrong-Hughes investigation early
in this to fairly recent years.
Given regulations and traditions, relative yields, taking account not
only of stipulated or expected regular income but also of the chance of
capital losses or gains and of the extent of price fluctuations, probably
have been a determining factor in the total size of an institution's stock
portfolio and even more in its makeup. Until World War I, and probably
even until World War II, expected current yields were probably the most
important single factor. In the postwar period, however, chances of capital
gains (and risk of capital loss) have come to play a more important role,
together with tax considerations and protection against inflation, in
determining the size and the structure of institutional stock portfolios.
Report of the Joint Committee of the Senate and Assembly of the State of New York Appointed
to investigate the Affairs of Ljfe Insurance Companies, 1906.22 InstitutionalInvestors
Liquidity, i.e., the chance of being able to sell blocks of stock rapidly
and without substantially influencing their price, has been an important
factor for those types of financial institutions that keep a substantial part
of their total assets in corporate stock, particularly in common stock, and
may have to face substantial withdrawals or other needs for funds. Thus,
liquidity is likely to have played the relatively greatest role in determining
the size and makeup of the stock portfolio in the case of investmetlt com-
panies and of non-life-insurance companies.
A minor factor accounting for a small proportion of total stock held by
financial institutions is convenience. This is responsible for the relatively
moderate holdings of stocks in real estate corporations that own the
building .in which the institution conducts its business and of service
corporations, like safe-deposit corporations, owned by commercial banks.
Another minor factor is the involuntary acquisition of stock, particu-
larly the exchange of stock for bonds or loans issued by debtors forced to
reorganize their capital structure.
A final factor, which at times has been of importance, is control of either
financial institutions of the same type as the holder or of other financial or
nonfinancial corporations. Because such holdings usually have been pro-
hibited by regulations, particularly during the last half century, they have
constituted only a relatively small proportion of the total stock holdings
of financial institutions. There are two exceptions, however: the holdings
of stocks of operating non-life-insurance companies by other companies
of this type, and the holdings of commercial bank stocks by life insurance
companies in the two decades or so before the Armstrong-Hughes in-
vestigation.
These different types of stockholdings are rarely, if ever, specifically
distinguished in the balance sheets or other accounting records of financial
institutions. The character of a specific stockholding generally can only be
inferred from the nature of the holding itself.
In view of the multiplicity, variety, and, in some cases, nonquantitative
nature of the factors apparently influencing the share of corporate stock
in the asset holdings and acquisitions of financial institutions it is not
surprising that efforts at an econometric determination of the shares have
so far been unsuccessful.'2
d. The Supply of Corporate Stock
The supply of corporate stock from' which the holdings of financial
12SeeChapter 5, section 2.Basic Considerations 23
institutionsare drawn may be divided into three categories whose levels
and movements often differ considerably.
The first, and in practice by far the most important, component
consists of the stock of domestic nonfinancial corporations. Issues of such
stock (net of retirements) during any given period (e0) may be regarded as
the product of (1) total issues of securities by domestic nonfinancial
corporations including all forms of debt (ia) and (2) the share of stocks in
total issues (at). The first component, in turn, can be resolved into total
gross capital expenditures by nonfinancial corporations (Ice) and their
external financing ratio (ge,= aformulation based on the assump-
tion that a substantial part of the stock issues of nonfinancial corporations
are connected with their capital expenditures, defined more or less broadly.
Total capital expenditures of nonfinancial corporations, finally, may be
expressed as the product of total national capital formation (k) and the
share of nonfinancial corporations in national capital formation=
ks/k).Again expressing the supply of corporate stock in terms of gross
national product rather than as an absolute figure, we obtain the following
expression for the supply of stock by nonfinancial domestic corporations:
e0k
=xxx , _y
where kfy is the national capital formation ratio. The left-hand ratio
e0/y may be regarded and interpreted as a weighted average of correspond-
ing ratios for the main groups of nonfinancial corporations which differ
considerably in the relevant values of b, g, and a.
To illustrate, using values not too far from those observed in the United
States during the postwar period (and including consumer and govern-
ment durables in capital formation), we obtain
—= 0.25x 0.50 x 0.30 x 0.10 =0.00375.
Thus, the indicated volume of net new issues of stock by domestic non-
financial corporations is slightly less than 0.4 percent of gross national
product.
The value of an expression of this type, which must be regarded as
reflecting definitional and functional interrelationships rather than uni-
directional causal connections, is that it shows the relative contribution of
four relevant economic magnitudes (the national capital formation ratio,
the share of nonfinancial corporations in national capital formation, the24 InstitutionalInvestors
share of external in total financing of nonfinancial corporations, and the
share of stock in these corporations' external financing) to the stock issue
ratio of nonfinancial corporations. It also permits us to see whether and
how the ratio and its components have changed over time. This is not the
place to attempt an explanation of the factors which are responsible for
the level and movements of these four magnitudes.
The value of the stock of nonfinancial corporations outstanding at any
one date of course equals (1) the sum of past issues of such stock
(Eec)and(2) the differences between the original issue price and the
market price at balance sheet valuation of all previously issued stock —
afigure which, of course, depends on the movements of stock prices,
so that= + — Inpractice itis usually possible to
estimateand directlywith a fair degree of accuracy. Aggregate
capital gains — mustbe obtained as their difference rather than
directly as —es).
Thesecond and third components of the holdings of corporate stock
that are relevant for financial institutions—the stock of domestic financial
corporations and the stock of foreign corporations—are of sufficiently
small importance for this study to be regarded as exogenous.
However, domestic financial stock issues could be explained by linking
them to the total issues of financial institutions or, more appropriately, to
the ratio of total issues to gross national product Designatingthe share
of the issues of those financial institutions that operate in corporate (rather
than mutual) form by h, and the proportion of stock in total issues of
corporate financial institutions by a1, we obtain the following expression




an expression in which a1 may be regarded as the weighted average of the
a ratio for the various groups of financial institutions that issue stock, i.e.,
primarily commercial banks, property insurance companies, finance
companies, and investment companies.
4.THEUSE OF NATIONAL BALANCE SHEETS AND FLOW OF FUNDS
ACCOUNTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL STOCKHOLDINGS
It would be possible to analyze the level and movements of corporate
stockholdings by financial institutions on a piecemeal basis, using onlyBasic Considerations 25
suchstatistics as happen to he at hand and as are needed in the calculation
of the two crucial ratios: the holdings of corporate stock to total assets of
the different types of financial institutions, and the stockholdings by
financial institutions to the total amount of stock of. different types
outstanding. To do so, however, while it would considerably reduce the
volume of data needed, would not permit us to show the interrelationships
between the holdings of stock and of other uses and sources of funds for the
different types of financial institutions; between stocks held by financial
institutions and those held by other sectors; and between the issuance of
stock and other sources and uses of funds of corporations. In other words,
such a limited scope of investigation would not provide sufficient material
for a satisfactory analysis of the demand for the supply of corporate stock
by important sectors of the economy.
Since the Securities and Exchange Commission felt that it needed a
comprehensive and consistent picture of stocks and• flows of corporate
shares in the postwar American economy for its detailed study of financial
institutions and the stock market in recent years, use was made of an
organized body of statistical data for that period, developed as a part of a
comprehensive system of national accounts. This material is known as the
Flow of Funds System, although it actually has a broader scope, including
integrated information on both stocks of assets and liabilities in existence
at a point of time (balance sheet dates) and flows during a period between
balance sheet dates (the flow of funds in a narrow sense).
The system of national accounts includes balance sheets and flow of
funds statements for as many separate sectors of the economy as are
important for the analysis and as can be derived on the basis of the
statistical material in existence. Such a system automatically not only
provides the two desired sets of ratios of stock holdings to total assets
of financial institutions and of such holdings to total stock outstanding,
but also permits for each sector (1) an analysis of the structure of assets
held and hence of portfolio policies, and (2) of methods of financing and
thus of the role of corporate stock as a source of funds. It also makes it
possible—provided some additional statistical material is available—to
set up a stock and a flow matrix for corporate stock, showing, respectively,
interrelations between issuing and holding sectors of corporate stock at a
given point of time, or the purchases and sales of stock among sectors
during a period of time.
As a starting point in building up sectoral balance sheets and flow of
funds accounts for the period 1952—68 on which the investigation centered,
there were available the flow of funds accounts of the Federal Reserve26 InstitutionalInvestors
Board, limited to financial assets and liabilities,13 and complete annual
sectoral balance sheets for the years. 1952—58 in Studies in 1/ic National
Balance Sheet of the United States.'4
Owing to the considerable amounts of basic statistical data that have
become available during the 1960's, it became necessary to recalculate
the estimates of stocks and flows of tangible assets for the entire period
1952—68, with only limited recourse to the earlier estimates for the first
few years of the period. While the Federal Reserve Board estimates of
stocks and flows of financial assets could be accepted with only minor
changes, it was found essential for the present study to supplement these
figures in several directions, mainly by breaking down the household
sector into about half-a-dozen subsectors, by separately estimating the
assets and transactions of personal trust departments of commercial banks
and their transfer to the financial institution sector, and by including
several minor types of financial institutions. The statistical problems
arising in these estimates are described in the appendix and are briefly•
summarized in the following section.
5. STATISTICAL PROBLEMS
Information on the sources of data .and the jnethods of estimation of
the stock and how data used in the study are provided in Appendix I.
At this point it will suffice to discuss three statistical problems of general
importance: first, the grouping of the more than 70 million economic
units now operating in the United States (households, business enter-
prises, and governments) into sectors for which separate balance sheets
and sources and uses of funds statements are constructed.; second, the
classification of the very large number of types of assets and liabilities
into a few reasonably homogeneous categories; and third, the methods
used in valuing assets, liabilities, and equity in balance sheets and in
deriving estimates of fund flows from balance sheet data.
a.
Sectorization should theoretically be guided by the principle that the
units included in a sector are as homogeneous as possible in their economic
behavior (in this study, in their portfolio and stock trading policies).
Actual sectoring is a compromise between this principle and available
13Theresults obtained are published in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Flow of Funds Accounts 1945—1968, May 1970. The study, however, used somewhat
more detailed and occasionally revised worksheets.
14Goldsmith,Lipsey, and Mendelson (see note 3, above).Basic Considerations 27
statisticaldata, particularly because of the need to adapt to the existing
flow of funds statistics and national balance sheet estimates.
For purposes of this study the essential separation is between financial
institutions and nonfinancial sectors. Financial institutions have been
defined as organizations that keep most of their assets in the form of claims
against, or equity securities of, numerous issuers which they do not control
through stock ownership, and that obtain most of their funds from the
public rather than from a very narrow group of stockholders or creditors.
The grouping of the many organizations meeting this definition follows
the traditional pattern, the only one for which extensive statistics are
available.15 The sectoral balance sheets and flow of funds statements
for the period 1952—68 thus distinguish the following groups of domestic
financial institutions:
I. Federal Reserve banks
2. Commercial banks
3. Mutual savings banks
4. Savings and loan associations
5. Credit unions
6. Federal lending agencies
7. Mortgage companies
8. Finance companies
9. Life insurance companies
10. Fraternal insurance organizations
11. Non-life insurance companies
12. Private (nôninsured) pension funds
13. State and local pension funds
14. Open-end investment companies
15. Closed-end investment companies
16. Personal trust departments of commercial banks
17. Common trust funds of commercial banks
18. Security brokers and dealers.
Asin practically all such classifications, not every unit belonging to each of the groups
defined as financial institutions completely meets the tests laid down above. Thus, captive
finance companies may receive all their funds from their parent as undoubtedly do some
units in some of the other groups. On the other hand, federal pension funds, as well as
the social security system, do not have a diversified portfolio of securities but are limited
to obligations of the U.S. Treasury. In such borderline cases the inclusion in or exclusion
from the group of financial institutions is to some extent arbitrary. In most such cases the
breakdown of a group of institutions into those which belong to the class of
institutions under strict interpretation of the definition and those that do not is not
feasible statistically.28 InstitutionalInvestors
For the period before 1952 a few of the smaller groups are omitted
because of lack of data. Some other groups (e.g., 6, 12—15, and 17) enter
the statistics only when they become of substantial size, usually in the
1920's or 1930's.
Among the nonfinancial sectors three do not present substantial con-
ceptual or statistical difficulties: nonfinancial corporations, state and local
governments, and the rest of the world. All three sectors constitute
reasonably well-defined groups for which comprehensive statistics are
available—for nonfinancial corporations from the Internal Revenue
Service, for state and local governments from the Bureau of the Census,
and for the rest of the world from balance of payments statistics—
although not in as much detail as would be desirable for the present
study..
For nonfinancial corporations a problem arises due to the absence of
subsectoring in previous estimates of national balance sheets in flow of
funds statistics, notwithstanding very considerable differences in the
economic character and in the financial behavior of such subgroups. An
attempt was therefore made to break down the total figures for non-
financial corporations into four subsectors (manufacturing and mining,
transportation,communication, andthenecessarilyheterogeneous
remainder), but the difficulties encountered in this attempt were such
that no usable estimates could be produced within the confines of this study.
The state and local government sector excludes pension funds of state
and local government employees, which are treated as one subgroup of
financial institutions. The general funds of state and local governments,
however, remain in the sector. So do the relatively small public utility
and similar business-type activities of state and local governments.
The estimates for the federal government sector do not include govern-
ment lending agencies (the most important are in the fields of housing,
farm credit, and foreign trade), which are regarded as a subgroup (6) of
the financial institutions sector. On the other hand, the funds accumulated
for federal employees' pension funds, as well as for the social security
system, which could well be regarded as another subgroup, have in
accordance with past practice been left in the federal government sector.
Occasionally, however, it is indicated how a shift of these organizations to
the financial institutions sector would affect the figures.
It has been common practice, due to statistical necessity, to obtain most
estimates for the "household" sector as a residual, i.e., by subtracting
from the national total aggregate, figures for all other domestic sectors and
for the rest of the world. As a result, the so-called household sector hasBasic Considerations 29
includednonprofit institutions and the assets owned by households but
administered by trustees (mostly financial organizations), as well as house-
holds proper, unattached individuals, and the statistical errors inherent in
this procedure. This sector, therefore, has lacked homogeneity, particu-
larly from the point of view of the management of its financial assets.
In this study two steps have been taken to make the household sector
data more homogeneous, particularly for financial analysis. Unfortunately
both steps, although important, cannot in the present state of the statistical
material go as far as could be desired.
The first step is the separation of funds held by the personal trust
departments of commercial banks, which have been made an independent
subsector (16) of the financial institutions sector. Logically trust funds
administered by nonbank trustees as well as funds effectively administered,
although not legally held under trustee arrangements, by investment
advisers should be treated similarly. This is not yet possible. For invest-
ment advisers, however, at least the present order of magnitude of the
funds managed is known.
A second step is the separation of foundations and private educational
institutions, the two largest components of nonprofit institutions from the
point of view of their financial assets. It also has been possible to estimate
the financial assets of labor unions (see Appendix IV), but they have not
been eliminated from the "household" sector because of their moderate
size and the unavailability of sufficient asset breakdown for part of the
period. It has not been feasible to treat other nonprofit institutions,
particularly churches and hospitals, in the same way, but the fragmentary
currently available information indicates that their financial assets, and
particularly their stockholdings, are relatively small compared with those
of foundations and private educational institutions.
The household sector so purified stillis of a quite heterogeneous
character. An attempt has been made, therefore, to allocate the estimated
total of financial assets of the sector among half a dozen subsectors of
households having different amounts of total wealth. These estimates are
necessarily of a very rough character and could be made only for a few
recent years. Their derivation and limitations are described in Appendix V.
b. Classification of Assets and Liabilities
Given the very large number of types of tangible assets and of financial
instruments and the often vague distinction among them, an integrated
system of sectoral balance sheets and flow of funds statements requires a
standardized classification of assets and liabilities into a manageable30 InstitutionalInvestors
number of reasonably homogeneous types, a classification that can be
implemented for all sectors that are distinguished. Such a system obviously
cannot provide for separate presentation of all types of assets or of all types
of liabilities that may be important for one or for a few sectors or subsectors.
It must be limited to those types that are significant for most sectors; that
differ substantially in their economic character; and that can be estimated
without an excessive margin of error.
The standard classification adopted for this study, set forth in Table 1-1,
is, like most such classifications, a result of compromise.. It provides a
minimum of seven types of tangible assets and five types of financial
instruments (money, short-term claims, long-term claims, corporate
shares, and equity in unincorporated business enterprises) while net
worth is obtained as the difference between total assets and total liabili-
ties.16 However, the classification also permits a finer breakdown of
financial instruments—the three-digit categories in Table 1-1 and the
more detailed four-digit categories which may be added—for sectors
where the data are available and where these classifications are sufficiently
important in the sectors' portfolio structure. Actually it has been possible
to implement the three-digit classification for most financial subsectors and
for some nonfinancial sectors.
Because of the limitation of the basic statistical data the separation of
long-term and short-term claims (categories 220, 330, 420, and 430)
requires for a few sectors rather rough methods of allocation. This is
unlikely to introduce errors that are significant in the over-all picture.
More serious is the fact that the content of long- and particularly of
short-term claims is not identical in the documents on which estimates
for individual sectors are based. This applies particularly to the treatment
of accrued claims and liabilities and of reserves for losses. Such discrepan-
cies are one. of the reasons why the national total of claims and liabilities
are not equal. Differences in valuation of the same instrument by the holder
and issuer and in timing of identical transactions in the accounts of the
buyer and seller provide other reasons.
It should be noted that a few types of tangible assets (consumers' inven-
tories of semidurable and perishable commodities; military equipment;
subsoil assets; monuments; collectors' items) that are sometimes included
in national wealth have been omitted, mainly because of the impossibility
or extreme difficulty of obtaining estimates that are more than guesses
or (in the case of military equipment and monuments) because of doubts
18Detailsabout the definition of these and their statistical implementation
will be found in Appendix I.Basic Considerations 31
TABLE1-I
Stock and Flow Categories
100 Tangible assets 300 Total assets
110 Lands 400 Liabilities
120 Reproducible tangible assets 410 Domestic moneyb
121 Residential structures 420 Other short-term liabilities
122 Nonresidential structures 421 Bank debt
123 Producer durable equip- 422 Trade debt
ment 423 Other
124 Consumer durables 430 Long-term liabilities
125 Inventories 431 Bonds
126 Monetary metals 432 Mortgages
200 Financial assets 433 Other
210 Domestic moneyb 500 Net worth(300 —400)
220 Other short-term claims









250 Equity in unincorporated
businesses 600 Total liabilities and net worth
aDoesnot include subsoil assets.
b Currency and check deposits.
°Furtherbreakdowns in statements of individual sectors and subsectors would be
designated as 2211 and so on. Categories 221—223, 231—233, 421—423, and 431—433
may have to be omitted in some sectors.
Does not include claims against financial institutions; intermediate-term claims
included where possible.
about their economic significance.17 Similarly some financial assets (such
as goodwill and patents) are included only to the very incomplete and
unsystematic extent to which they happen to appear in the balance sheets
of nonfinancial corporations. In this case elimination of these items would
be the conceptually indicated procedure.
17Forestimates of subsoil assets, see R. W. Goldsmith in Studies in Income and Wealth,
Vol. 14, New York, NBER, 1951, p.48 if.; and for those of military equipment in 1952—58,
seeR. W. Goldsmith, The National Wealth of the United States in th€ Postwar Period, Princeton,
Princeton University Press for NBER, 1962, p. 118.32 InstitutionalInvestors
c. Valuation
In principle all items in a balance sheet should be valued at the market
price, or at the nearest approximation to it, in order to obtain figures
comparable among sectors and among assets and liabilities, while all
entries in flow of funds statements should be made at actual transactions
values. Limitations in the basic statistical data, as well as some conceptual
difficulties, do not permit a consistent application of these principles in
actual statistical work to all sectors and to all types of assets and liabilities.
Among tangible assets no market values exist for most categories of
nonresidential structures, such as large industrial installations and govern-
ment structures, and for most types of producer equipment. Here estimated
replacement Cost, appropriately depreciated for the age of the structure or
equipment, must be used as a substitute. Figures of this type can be ob-
tained by applying to the estimated original cost price indexes that are
not always adequate and that generally do not take into account quality
improvement, particularly in the case of equipment, and hence probably
overstate the increase in prices. These difficulties are discussed in Appen-
dix I. Estimates of the value of land present some conceptual and statistical
problems of their own that are described in Appendix II.
Among financial assets the most important deviation from the general
principle of valuation at "market" is the valuation of long-term debt at
face or book value, both where the instruments are traded and where there
is no actual market. This defect is not inherent in the method used in
compiling sectorial balance sheets, but is due to the limitations of time and
resources under which the study was conducted. In a period of generally
rising interest rates such as 1952—68, particularly during the later part of
the period, the use of book or face values instead of market overstates
the actual or hypothetical market value of long-term debt. Insofar as the
figures are intended to reflect the values that determine the behavior of
holders and issuers, however, it is doubtful that an unequivocal application
of market values, or their hypothetical equivalent, would be appropriate.
Possibly some figures between face or book value and market value may be
preferable, although actual calculation is hardly practicable.19
Since there was no possibility to adjust the face or book value of long-term debt to
market or equivalent values we did not have to face the difficult and disputed question
whether the adjustment should be applied, if at all, only to holders' balance sheets while
such debt should be carried in issuers' balance sheets at redemption value irrespective of
its market value. The entries in the flow of funds statements are not affected by the
adjustment since it reflects an unrealized capital gain or loss which, of course, is not.taken
into account in the flow of funds estimates.Basic Considerations 33
Inthe case of corporate stock a specific valuation is needed only for
holders, and here market value, or a value which in the case of unlisted
securities approximates it, is the indicated standard. While the margin of
error in such an estimate is undoubtedly substantial for unlisted stocks, they
fortunately constitute only a small portion of total outstanding corporate
stock so that even a substantial error would not decisively affect estimates
for all corporate stock outstanding. In the case of sectors issuing corporate
stock, i.e., nonfinancial corporations and most of the subsectors of the
finance sector, no use is made of the market value of the stock because net
worth is estimated as the difference between the market value of total
assets and the value (essentially the face value) of liabilities.
Difficulties in the case of the flow of funds statements arise from the
fact that virtually all estimates for claims are derived as the first difference
between the values of the stock of claims at the beginning and at the end
of a period. Since these are essentially face or book values, the difference
between them includes realized capital gains and losses as well as other
revaluations. To correct the first differences for these items detailed income
statements are needed, but are not available for most of the nonfinancial
sectors and for part of the subsectors of the financial sector. Even where
some data of this type are available resources were lacking to carefully
investigate the material and to blow up the fragmentary data to cover an
entire sector or subsector. The only exceptions are realized capital gains
and losses by commercial banks in their transactions in U.S. government
securities, which already are allowed for in flow of funds figures published
by the Federal Reserve Board. In the period covered by the study, which
has been characterized by rising interest rates and falling bond prices,
omission of this adjustment leads to an overstatement of net purchases, or
an understatement of net sales of bonds by the trading sectors. It is un-
likely, however, that the adjustment would be large enough to affect any
of the major trends disclosed by the figures except for a few years, a few
types of long-term claims, and a few subsectors of the finance sector.